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The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law
MARTN H. MALIN*
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the public sector has become increasingly important in collective
bargaining. In 2008, only 7.6% of private sector workers were union members and only
8.4% were represented by unions.' In contrast, 36.8% of public employees were union
members and 40.7% were represented by unions.2 Despite these figures, collective
bargaining by public employees remains controversial. Although most jurisdictions
have statutes granting collective bargaining rights to at least some public employees,
North Carolina and Virginia expressly prohibit public sector collective bargaining by
statute. In recent years, governors in Indiana, Kentucky, and Missouri have revoked
executive orders that had given employees of those states collective bargaining rights,4
while governors in Arizona and Colorado have issued executive orders providing for
collective representation of state executive branch employees. 5 Regulations by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense sought to
severely curtail collective bargaining rights of their employees. The D.C. Circuit struck
down the DHS regulations, 6 but the same court upheld the Department of Defense
regulations.
7
Two of the most powerful arguments against public employee collective bargaining
are that it is antidemocratic and that it impedes effective government. At one time these
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1. BuREAu OF LABOR STATIsncs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE No. 09-0095,
UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, at 8 tbl.3 (2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. The term "union members" is defined as
"members of a labor union or an employee association similar to a union." Id. The term
"represented by unions" includes "workers who report no union affiliation but whose jobs are
covered by a union or an employee association contract," in addition to "union members." Id.
2. Id.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-98 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (2008).
4. See David Bacon, The Midwest Union Rollback, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005,
available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/I 958/themidwestunion-rollback/; Rebecca
Clarren, New Governor Trashes Union Rights of Indiana State Workers, THE NEW STANDARD,
Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfin/items/1409.
5. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2008-30, 14 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 4947 (Dec. 26, 2008); Colo.
Exec. Order No. D 028 07 (Nov. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=l 199121589584&pagename--GovRitter%
2FGOVRLayout (click on the corresponding hyperlink in the table of"D" Orders).
6. Nat'l Treas. Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
7. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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arguments were invoked to justify prohibiting public employees from joining unions.8
Today, the arguments are invoked in some jurisdictions to preclude collective
bargaining by public employees. However, even in jurisdictions that recognize public
employees' rights to bargain collectively, these concerns are used to narrow the scope
of what must be and, in some cases, what may be negotiated. The argument that
collective bargaining is antidemocratic is invoked most often by courts in narrowing
the scope of what is negotiable. Although the argument that collective bargaining
impedes effective government is sometimes advanced by courts when refusing to
enforce collective bargaining agreements, the effective government argument is more
often used by the legislative and executive branches as a backlash against public
employee unions and as justification for further narrowing the scope of negotiability.
In this Article, I contend that the narrowness of what is negotiable which results
from concerns with the antidemocratic tendencies of collective bargaining leads to
collective bargaining impeding effective government. Specifically, I argue that the law
governing negotiability channels unions away from participation in, and hence
responsibility for, decisions affecting the risks of the public sector enterprise and
restricts the unions to negotiating contract provisions that protect employees from
those risks. Unions perform their narrow role very effectively-so effectively that the
results can impede effective government. Part I discusses the argument that public
sector collective bargaining is antidemocratic. Part II discusses the argument that
public sector collective bargaining impedes effective government. Part III presents the
paradox of how the narrow scope of bargaining resulting from concerns with the
antidemocratic nature of public sector collective bargaining channels the parties'
dealings to the point where collective bargaining can impede effective government.
Part IV calls upon the jurisdictions to experiment with reforms.
I. THE ARGUMENT THAT PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS
ANTIDEMOCRATIC
Many years ago, when my children were in elementary school, the municipality in
which I resided was facing a significant budget deficit. The village manager's
proposals to save money included eliminating the eight paid, part-time school crossing
guard positions and substituting parent volunteers. The proposal outraged many
parents-including me. Operating through the Parent-Teacher Organization (PTO), we
lobbied for the village board to reject the proposal and find another way to close the
budget gap. The union that represented the crossing guards also lobbied against the
proposal. Although the union's arguments were couched similarly to the PTO's
arguments, which focused on the safety of children walking to school, its primary
interest was to preserve the jobs of its members.
At the village board meeting where the issue was considered, no individuals, or
organized interest groups supported the village manager's proposal. Although the
union spoke against the proposal, it demonstrated its political intelligence by largely
staying in the background and allowing the PTO to lead the charge by parading
8. See Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know "What a Labor Union Is": How State
Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public SectorLaborLaw, 79 OR. L. REV.
981,989-1021 (2000).
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parents, teachers, and school administrators before the board, each emphasizing the
folly of the proposal. The result was not surprising. The village board voted to table the
proposal and refer it to a committee consisting of parents, teachers, school
administrators, and a representative of the village manager's office to study ways of
reducing the costs of the program. Eventually, the committee recommended turning
one intersection staffed by a crossing guard into an all-way stop, eliminating that
crossing guard position while retaining the seven other crossing guards. The village
board accepted the recommendation, the new stop signs were erected, and the one
position was eliminated.
Assume, however, that the union demanded that the village negotiate the proposal to
replace the crossing guards with unpaid volunteers or to negotiate the effects of the
proposal on the employees. Viewed from a private sector perspective, under the
National Labor Relations Act,9 the decision to replace the crossing guards with unpaid
volunteers turned on labor costs. It represented a decision to replace bargaining unit
employees with a cheaper workforce. As such, it was a mandatory subject of
bargaining; that is, the employer would be required to negotiate the decision with the
union representing the employees.' 0 Even if the decision itself was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the effects of the decision on the employees whose jobs were to
be eliminated would be a mandatory subject.' 1 If the decision itself was bargained, the
union's goal would be to change it. If the effects were bargained, the union's goal
would be to raise the cost of implementation of the decision to the point where the
decision was no longer worth implementing. Depending on the respective state's law,
the union's negotiating position could be backed by a lawful threat to strike,12 or a
threat to compel the employer to arbitrate the issue if negotiations did not produce
agreement. 13
Assume further that there were eight crossing guard positions, but the union knew
that three of the eight incumbents would not be returning the following school year.
The union might have been willing to agree in bargaining to the elimination of three
positions effective with the start of the next school year, particularly if the union could,
in exchange, get concessions that did not cost the village any money but were valuable
to the union. The village would likely be willing to agree to such a deal, rather than
face a potential strike or risk a less favorable result in interest arbitration. Upon
announcement of the result, the parents would likely be outraged-not only over the
elimination of the three positions, but also over their exclusion from the decision-
making process. Although the village board would have to ratify the agreement in a
public meeting, at which the parents would have the opportunity to voice their
displeasure, by that point it would have been a done deal and the parents' voices would
have been largely ineffective.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
10. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,209-10 (1964).
11. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1981).
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.080 (2008); HAw. REv. STAT. § 89-12 (2008); 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/17 (West 2005); 115 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/13 (West 2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179A. 18 (West 2006); Oi-no REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (LexisNexis 2007).
13. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-
153f(West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965
(2007); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(C)(6) (West 2002).
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The contrasting ways in which the crossing guard issue might have been handled
illustrate why many regard public sector collective bargaining to be antidemocratic.
According to this view, public employees' wages and working conditions raise
inherently political issues. Whether the village should employ crossing guards raised
serious public policy issues concerning spending priorities and revenue sources. There
was no question that the village had to close its budget deficit. There was, however, a
serious question over the safety risks posed by the elimination of crossing guards when
weighed against the cost of the guards and against other ways which the village could
conserve funds or raise additional revenue. More generally, employee salaries and
benefits usually comprise the largest portion of public employer budgets and,
ultimately, affects spending priorities and tax rates. Subjecting such matters to
collective bargaining, the argument goes, provides one interest group-the union-
with an avenue of access to public decision makers that is denied to every other interest
group. As Wellington and Winter observed in their classic work, The Unions and the
Cities, "[A] full transplant of collective bargaining [from the private sector] ... would,
in many cases, institutionalize the power of public employee unions in a way that
would leave competing [interest] groups in the political process at a permanent and
substantial disadvantage."'
14
The view that public employee collective bargaining is antidemocratic figures
prominently in arguments for eliminating or greatly restricting collective representation
of government employees. For example, Professor Robert Summers has argued against
enactment or continuation of public employee labor relations acts on the ground that
any collective bargaining by public employees inherently diminishes democracy.15 The
view that collective representation of public employees undermines democracy also
figured prominently in the actions of President George W. Bush in dealing with the
federal workforce.
During his first month in office, President Bush revoked Executive Order 12,87 1,
which President William Jefferson Clinton issued on October 1, 1993.16 Executive
Order 12,87 1, among other things, established the National Partnership Council and
called for the creation of labor-management partnerships throughout the executive
branch.17 The goal of the partnerships was to "champion change in Federal
Government agencies to transform them into organizations capable of delivering the
highest quality services to the American people."'
' 8
Because the scope of bargaining under the Federal Service Labor Management
Relations Act is so narrow, partnerships became the mechanism by which unions and
management handled most significant issues. The Clinton Administration's Office of
Personnel Management Director, Janice Lachance, characterized federal sector labor
relations as follows: "[P]artnership is the high wire act and collective bargaining is the
14. HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIEs 30
(1971).
15. Robert S. Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes
Democracy, GOV'T UNION REV., Winter 1980, at 5, 6.
16. Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2002), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101
(Supp. 2001).
17. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1994), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101
(1994).
18. Id.
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safety net."'19 In 1997, the National Partnership Council reported a trend among
partnerships to focus on what the Council characterized as "nontraditional issues,"
including reorganizations, quality issues, improvements in customer service, re-
engineering and streamlining work, the impact of new technology, reductions in force,
budget and staffing levels, privatization, and procurement.20
What the Clinton Administration viewed as good government and good labor
relations, the Bush Administration viewed as antidemocratic. As President Bush was
preparing to take office, the Heritage Foundation issued a report that called on him to
revoke Executive Order 12,871 as his first act involving the management of
government. 2 The report argued that labor-management partnerships were a major
impediment to the Bush Administration's ability to implement its political and policy
agenda.2 The report branded career civil servants as the "permanent government," a
segment that must be controlled and limited to using its expertise to implement policies
the President and his political appointees set. 23 It called on the Office of Presidential
Personnel to "make appointment decisions based on loyalty first and expertise second,
and that the whole governmental apparatus must be managed from this perspective.24
The Heritage Foundation report criticized Executive Order 12,871 for "reduc[ing]
the leverage any president can exert to ensure that the agencies accept and faithfully
implement his policy agenda. Without the central management tools to encourage and
reward constructive behavior, the president's agenda will be subordinated to internal
organizational priorities." 25 Thus, the Heritage Foundation called for a return to a
command and control approach to personnel management, with the command and
control exercised by political appointees selected for their loyalty to the President
rather than their technical expertise.
The Heritage Foundation's concerns that the partnership councils would impede the
President's policy agenda were grossly overstated. As developed in Part IV, the
partnership councils institutionalized an avenue of employee voice that challenged
employees, through their unions, to take responsibility for the efficient operation of
their agencies and the craft, artistic, or professional aspects of their work. Final
decision-making authority, however, continued to rest with agency managers who were
ultimately accountable to elected officials. The Heritage Foundation report essentially
called for a federal workforce that was obedient and robotic when government service
begs, not for obedience, but for smartness and invention.
Nevertheless, President Bush acted quickly on the Heritage Foundation's
recommendations. In revoking Executive Order 12,871, President Bush dissolved the
National Partnership Council and directed the heads of all executive agencies to
19. OPM Director Lachance Addresses Future of Federal Workforce, [Jan.-June] Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1759, at 422 (Apr. 13, 1998).
20. NAT'L P'SHIP COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROGRESS IN LABOR-
MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS 19-20 (1997).
21. GEORGE NESTERCZUK, DONALDJ. DEVINE&ROBERTE. MOFFIT, THEHERITAGE FOUND.,
TAKING CHARGE OF FEDERAL PERSONNEL (2001), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovemmentReforn/BG1404.cfin.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at Lesson No. 4.
25. Id. at Strategy No. 7.
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"promptly move to rescind any orders, rules, regulations, guidelines, or policies
implementing or enforcing Executive Order 12871 ....
The view that public sector collective bargaining is antidemocratic is not confined
to opponents of collective representation of public employees. For example, Professor
Clyde Summers, a leading academic proponent of public employee collective
representation, accepts the argument as a given. He argues that the antidemocratic
nature of collective bargaining is justified because public employees need the special
avenue of access that collective bargaining gives them. Without it, he contends, public
employees will be outnumbered in the political process by the general electorate who,
as consumers of the employees' services, will seek the most service for the lowest
price.27
The view that public employee collective bargaining is antidemocratic plays a major
role in jurisdictions that prohibit such bargaining. For example, enactment of the
Virginia statute prohibiting public sector collective bargaining was preceded by the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. County Board ofArlington
County, in which the court held that units of local government lacked authority to enter
into collective bargaining agreements. 28 At issue before the court was whether the
authority to recognize unions and bargain collectively with them was implied in a
county's and a school district's express authority to manage their jurisdictions' affairs
and make contracts for services.29 In addressing this question, the court characterized
the collective bargaining process as in tension with democratic principles.30
[T]here can be no question that the two boards involved in this case, by their
policies and agreements, not only have seriously restricted the rights of individual
employees to be heard but also have granted to labor unions a substantial voice in
the boards' ultimate right of decision in important matters affecting both the public
employer-employee relationship and the public duties imposed by law upon the
boards.3
As developed in Part III, the view that public sector collective bargaining is
antidemocratic also affects interpretation of public sector labor relations acts in states
that have enacted them.
26. Exec. Order 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2002), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101
(Supp. 2001).
27. See Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE
L.J. 1156, 1159-61 (1974).
28. 232 S.E.2d 30 (Va. 1977).
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id. For a history of the treatment of public sector collective bargaining in Virginia, see
Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor
Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming July 2009).
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II. THE ARGUMENT THAT PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPEDES
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
The primary issue that delayed the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security as a cabinet level department was the fate of collective bargaining rights for
employees of agencies that were to be merged into the new department. Among others,
Senator Phil Gramm expressed the view that collective bargaining was inconsistent
with national security in the post 9/11 environment, asking rhetorically, "Do we really
want some work rule negotiated prior to 9/11 to prevent us from finding somebody
who is carrying a bomb on a plane with your momma?,3 2 Similarly, in defending the
decision of Admiral James Loy, the head of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), to ban collective bargaining by TSA airport screeners, a TSA spokesperson
declared, "When it comes to responding to new intelligence or terrorist threats on a
moment's notice, we don't have time to check with a shop steward.,
33
The argument that collective bargaining would impede national security was a
specific application of a general view that public employee collective bargaining
impedes effective government. For example, in editorializing against collective
bargaining rights for airport screeners, MSNBC commentator Tucker Carlson
generalized against public employee unions' affect on government operations:
But we do know there are many people [who] would like to bring about another
9/11. So what are we doing about it?... Democrats argue that TSA employees
have a right to collective bargaining, and maybe they do. OK. But that is not the
question. The question is will unionized screeners make air travel safer.? Let's see.
Have teachers' unions made the schools better? Have government employee
unions improved [the] service at the DMV? As the head of the TSA explained to
the Senate this week, a unionized work force at the airport will have a quote,
"serious negative security impact." Well, that's it. That's all you need to know
about this question.34
The view that collective bargaining impedes effective government can be traced
back at least to the infamous Boston police strike of 1919. In August 1919, the AFL-
CIO chartered the Boston Policeman's Union. Boston police officers organized largely
because their wages had stagnated, despite a high rate of inflation induced by World
War I, and because they were forced to work extremely long shifts and to stay
overnight in unhealthy, decrepit police stations. The Boston Police Commissioner
responded by prohibiting officers from being members in the union or any other
organization apart from veterans' groups. The commissioner suspended nineteen
officers for their membership in the union, resulting in a walkout by three-fourths of
the officers on September 9, 1919. For two days, law and order broke down with
looting and rioting in downtown Boston and South Boston. Massachusetts Governor
32. 148 CONG. REc. 17,030 (2002).
33. Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers'Rights? What the Federal Government
Should Learn from History and Experience, and Why, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 315
(2004) (quoting Robert Johnson).
34. Tucker Carlson & Willie Geist, TUCKER 1800 Hour for March 7, 2007, MSNBC
NEWS, Mar. 7, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4345635.
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Calvin Coolidge called out the National Guard, which restored order. All of the strikers
were fired.35
The specter of the Boston police strike has hung over public employee collective
bargaining ever since. It led numerous courts to uphold public employer prohibitions
against union membership despite union disavowal of strikes and disavowal of seeking
traditional forms of collective bargaining. 36 As late as 1963, the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld the City of Muskegon's prohibition on police officer membership in labor
unions. 37 The city justified the prohibition on the ground that union membership was
inconsistent with fulfilling the duties of a police officer:
A police officer is required by law and invariably becomes a neutralizer in
controversies involving the right of public assemblage, neighborhood disputes,
domestic difficulties and strikes, between labor and management. Again, his
actions in these instances must be governed by his oath of office. He must
recognize certain rights of people among which is the right of collective
bargaining on the part of labor. Yet, at the same time, he must protect the rights
and the property of management. In this instance, again, his neutrality must be the
watchword of his every activity in the effort to protect the life and property of all
those involved and to preserve peace and order during periods of such difficulty.
38
More recently, the specter of the Boston police strike arose to strip certain federal
employees of their rights to organize and bargain collectively. On January 7, 2002,
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13,252, which, on national security
grounds, prohibited collective bargaining by employees in five subdivisions of the
Department of Justice: U.S. Attorneys' offices, Criminal Division, INTERPOL-U.S.
National Central Bureau, National Drug Intelligence Center, and Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review. 39 Even though it is a felony for a federal employee to engage in a
strike,40 White House spokesman Ari Fleischer defended the executive order saying,
"There is a long tradition that presidents of both parties have honored about protecting
the public by not allowing certain law enforcement or intelligence officials to strike.' 41
At a more general level, Professor Leo Troy has argued that public employee
collective bargaining inherently impedes effective government and leads to municipal
and school district bankruptcies.42 He attributes this to the political nature of public
sector collective bargaining and the conflict of interest that public officials face in
35. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNmENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW AND
THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 11-38 (2004).
36. See Slater, supra note 8, at 1010-13.
37. See Local 201, Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. City of Muskegon,
120 N.W.2d 197 (Mich. 1963).
38. Id. at 199.
39. Exec. Order No. 13,252, 3 C.F.R. 195 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7103 (2006).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (2006).
41. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, JUNE M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 14 (2004) (quoting White House spokesman Ari
Fleischer).
42. Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective Bargaining and Municipal Governance
Compatible?, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 453 (2003).
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having to manage their units of government while being dependent on the very unions
with whom they negotiate for support when they seek reelection.43
A full airing of the debate over whether public employee collective bargaining
impedes effective government has occurred in the ongoing debate over collective
bargaining rights for airport screeners employed by the TSA. In response to the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act,44 which federalized airport screeners. Section 111 (d)
authorized the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security to fix the terms and
conditions of security screeners "notwithstanding any other provision of law.' 45 On
January 8, 2003, the Under Secretary issued a memorandum stating that for purposes
of national security, airport screeners would not be allowed to be represented by a
labor union or engage in collective bargaining. As a consequence, the Federal Labor
Relations Authority dismissed representation petitions filed by the American
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) seeking elections to determine whether
the employees desired representation by AFGE.46
In the 2006 elections, Democrats gained a majority in the Senate and the House of
Representatives. In 2007, House and Senate Democrats inserted into the bill
implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Study Commission, a provision that
would have restored collective bargaining rights to TSA employees.47 That touched off
fierce opposition from the Bush Administration and its supporters.
A key theme of the opposition to collective bargaining rights for airport screeners
was the asserted incompatibility between collective bargaining and the flexibility
needed to ensure national security. For example, TSA Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley
noted that after the British bombing plot was uncovered in August 2006, screening
procedures were adjusted nationwide to deter liquid explosives and were implemented
within twelve hours without creating significant flight delays. He argued that TSA
required flexibility for responding rapidly to changing security issues and urged
Congress to reject collective bargaining rights for airport screeners because it would
inhibit such flexibility. 48 The Office of Management and Budget echoed these
concerns: "This flexibility is key to how DHS, through TSA, protects Americans while
they travel, both at home and abroad. These provisions, by eliminating these
authorities, would significantly diminish the Department's ability to respond quickly to
security threats and would ultimately reduce transportation security.
'49
43. Id.; see also Terry M. Moe, The Union Label and the Ballot Box, EDUC. NEXT, Summer
2006, at 59.
44. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
45. Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)(2) (Supp. 2002).
46. See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Border & Transport. Sec. Directorate, Transp. Sec.
Admin., 59 F.L.R.A. 423 (2003).
47. Improving America's Security Act of 2007, S. 4, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1, 110th
Cong. (2007).
48. Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec'y, Transp. Sec. Admin., Statement Before the Subcommittee
on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 13,
2007), available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/10-16-07_TestimonyHHS-TSIP_Hawley.pdf
[hereinafter Hawley Statement].
49. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POL'Y 2 (2007).
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Chief among the concerns voiced against collective bargaining was its impact on
deployment of personnel. Assistant Secretary Hawley criticized the proposal to give
airport screeners collective bargaining rights as "threaten[ing] to tie TSA's hands in
deploying [personnel] to respond to changing threats .. . ."50 The Office of
Management and Budget noted that TSA's response to the British bombing plot and to
Hurricane Katrina was facilitated by its ability to change employees' duties and work
locations quickly. 51 A Heritage Foundation Web Memo echoed these concerns, arguing
that "TSA ... needs the ability to rush screeners to high-risk locations and modify
screening procedures at a moment's notice.,
52
Opponents of collective bargaining by airport screeners argued that the need to
negotiate the impact and implementation of management decisions would interfere with
necessary deployment of personnel. For example, the Heritage Foundation cited an
arbitration award which held that the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) was obligated
to negotiate with the National Treasury Employees Union, the exclusive representative
of CBP employees, before reassigning personnel from the Port of Houston to Bush
International Airport and the Port of New Orleans. 3 The Senate Republican Policy
Committee added that "if TSA were required to negotiate with multiple unions for
every change in circumstance, it would take away from the agency's ability to rapidly
respond to threat information."54 In the House, Representative Pete Sessions was more
blunt, asserting that "[c]ollective bargaining would have prevented implementing fluid
operations for protecting our country by requiring TSA management to consult with
union bosses before making critical homeland security decisions."
55
Opponents of collective bargaining for airport screeners also cited likely work rules
that unions would negotiate which would impair the ability to respond to security
threats. Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina led the opposition in the Senate, arguing
that "[c]ollective bargaining will tie TSA's hands with needless red-tape and create a
homeland security disaster., 56 The Senate Republican Policy Committee contrasted
TSA screeners without collective bargaining to Canadian screeners who have
collective bargaining.57 It noted that as part of a labor dispute over Thanksgiving 2006,
screeners at Toronto's Pearson International Airport engaged in a work-to-rule
50. Hawley Statement, supra note 48.
51. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 49, at 2.
52. James Sherk, Collective BargainingforAirport Screeners Is Unnecessary andBadfor
National Security, No. 1372, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wml 372.cfin.
53. Id.
54. S. REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., PROVIDING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS TO TSA
EMPLOYEES UNDERMINES NATIONAL SECuRrrY 2 (2007), available at
http://rpc.senate.gov/public/_files/O22807TSABargainingRightsDB.pdf.
55. 153 CONG. Rc. H8790 (daily ed. July 27, 2007) (statement of Rep. Sessions).
56. Press Release, Senator Jim DeMint, Senate Democrats Vote to Weaken Homeland
Security (Mar. 6, 2007), available at
http://demint.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_
id=d 12c82b5-159b-48bb-90a3-6a2c 1 el 7c8a5&Month=3&Year=2007&Type=PressRelease.
57. S. REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., supra note 54, at 1-2.
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campaign which caused long lines and the rushing through of 250,000 passengers with
little or no screening.
58
Opponents of collective bargaining by airport screeners also cited the impact of
negotiated seniority provisions as inconsistent with national security. The Heritage
Foundation argued that seniority rules would result from collective bargaining and
would harm national security by precluding TSA's ability to assign the best screeners
to the most sensitive jobs and would inhibit TSA's ability to keep screeners
motivated.5 9 Similarly, the Senate Republican Policy Committee warned:
The agency's personnel system is based on performance, not seniority, and is
designed to reward "the best and the brightest." It is based on technical
competence, readiness for duty and operational performance. It continually trains
and upgrades the skills of its officers, making them available for higher pay and
advancement along the way. Yet collective bargaining could curtail opportunities
for advancement as training would all have to be negotiated with unions, even
when the employees request training. Under collective bargaining, training could
be subject to negotiation on need, design, order of training delivered, timeline, and
method of delivery.
60
Supporters of collective bargaining rights urged that union representation would
give employees voice and improve worker moral, leading to reduced attrition.
However, they did not address the specific arguments ofopponents beyond contending
that TSA had all the flexibility it needed because the Federal Service Labor Relations
Statute allows agencies to take all necessary action to carry out their missions during
61emergencies.
In public education, critics blame teacher unions for shortcomings in education
quality, citing allegedly excessive teacher salaries and benefits, work rules that
preclude flexibility necessary for school improvement, salary grids that preclude
incentives for excellent performance and allocation of resources to recruit in areas of
scarcity such as mathematics and science, and union defense of allegedly misfeasant
and malfeasant teachers who ought to be terminated. In other words, as two critics put
it, "collective bargaining is taking public education in an unsustainable direction,"
62
with teacher unions as guardians of a failed status quo.
The salary grid is one of the aspects of teacher collective bargaining agreements that
opponents frequently attack. The typical salary grid determines teacher pay based on
level of education and years of service. One editorial writer voiced a common
criticism, complaining that "[a]greements typically require that the worst teachers be
58. Id.
59. See Sherk, supra note 52.
60. S. REPUBUICAN POLICY COMM., supra note 54, at 3.
61. See, e.g., 153 CONG. Rc. E1729 (daily ed. July 27, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Thompson); Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives,
Comm. on Homeland Sec., to Michael Chertoff, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 1, 2007),
available at
http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=l 83&SubSection=0&Issue=&DocumentTyp
e=0&PublishDate=.
62. Howard Fuller & George A. Mitchell, A Culture of Complaint, EDUC. NEXT, Summer
2006, at 18, 18.
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paid the same as the best (since pay differentials are based on credentials and
experience, not merit). 63 The salary schedule has also been criticized for rewarding
graduate degrees without evidence that they improve teacher effectiveness and for
placing an inordinate amount of salary reward toward the end of the teacher's career
instead of at the beginning when the teacher makes the most progress in development.
64
This inefficient distribution of rewards is said to contribute to the problem of
significant attrition in the teacher ranks in the first years of a teacher's career. 65 The
uniform salary schedule also is criticized for making it difficult to recruit teachers in
areas of scarcity, such as math and science.66
Other criticisms of collective bargaining in public education are comparable to the
criticism that collective bargaining inhibits needed flexibility in national security.
Critics decry transfer rights under collective bargaining agreements that limit
administrators' ability to fill vacancies with the best qualified person.67 They also decry
the difficulties involved in terminating ineffective, incompetent, or misbehaving
teachers.68 And, they attack the plethora of collectively negotiated work rules. As one
observer noted:
Collective bargaining agreements are often the scar tissue of the struggle between
the parties' attempts to limit the arbitrary discretion of the other side. Flip through
a thick contract and you'll see many examples of attempts to define transfer rights
and time use. Managers want to impose rules on the behavior of teachers while
maintaining maximum flexibility in deploying them as an asset. Unions want to
limit the arbitrary discretion of management. Each parry and thrust becomes
restrictive contract language that defines in minute detail the limits of each party's
discretion until the document itself is an embodiment of the sclerosis of the
relationship.
69
Examples cited include the Milwaukee Public Schools, where critics contend the
parties are governed by a "232-page contract with more than 2,000 additional
63. Paul E. Peterson, Let the Public in: How Closed Negotiations with Unions Are Hurting
Our Schools, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 5, 5; see also MARK J. HOLLEY & PATRICK J.
WRIGHT, MACKINAC CENTER POLICY BRIEF: A MERIT-PAY PILOT PROGRAM FOR MICHIGAN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, No. S2008-7, at 1 (2008) (opining that salary grid does not encourage teachers
to improve student performance but instead encourages them to spend nights and weekends
studying for advanced degrees that will not increase their effectiveness); Maya Kremen, Tenure
Helps Good Teachers and Shelters the Bad Ones, THE RECORD, July 19, 2006 (contrasting a
teacher cited for failing to monitor and supervise her classroom who was making $86,350 per
year with the teacher voted best teacher at North Bergen (N.J.) High School who was making
$47,550 per year and complaining that "[t]eachers are paid based on how long they've been
around, not how well they perform").
64. See Jacob Vigdor, Scrap the Sacrosanct Salary Schedule: How About More Pay for
New Teachers, Less for Older Ones, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2008, at 37.
65. See id. Interestingly, Professor Vigdor's analysis focused on teacher salary schedules in
North Carolina which cannot be the product of collective bargaining because that state prohibits
collective bargaining by units of local government.
66. See Eva Moscowitz, Breakdown, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 24, 25.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., id; Kremen, supra note 63; Peterson, supra note 63.
69. Linda Kaboolian, Table Talk, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 14, 16.
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supporting documents," resulting in "[a]n endless debate about what is and is not
allowed in the daily governance of the school system and the creation of an
environment where the interests of students are routinely subordinated to those of adult
teachers., 70 The documents, according to critics, preclude principals from requiring
teachers to submit lesson plans periodically, limit the amount of time teachers can be
required to attend meetings, and prevent principals from requiring teachers to attend
meetings before or after school to write goals and objectives.7' Critics also point to
New York City, where a contract of more than 200 pages, coupled with side
agreements and state laws, "determine nearly every aspect of what a teacher does, and
does not do . . . and what can and can't be done to them," including limiting their
teaching to 3.75 hours per day and precluding requiring teachers to supervise
lunchroom or study hall, help special-education students off buses, write truant slips,
help college applicants prepare transcripts, and score city-wide tests.
72
Some advocates of charter schools view them as one method of freeing public
education from the allegedly obstructionist and counterproductive activities of teacher
unions.73 As Paul Hill and his colleagues observed, "Charter school leaders equate the
[union] vision of professionalism with resistance to change and protection of unfit
teachers.,
74
The 1990s saw a significant amount of backlash against teacher collective
bargaining. In Ohio, the legislature reacted to perceived inefficiencies in state
university professors' workload by prohibiting bargaining on that subject.75 In 1994,
Michigan prohibited bargaining on the identity of a school district's group insurance
carrier, the starting day of the school term and the amount of required pupil contact
time, composition of site-based decision-making bodies, decisions whether to provide
70. Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 62, at 20; see also Howard L. Fuller, George A. Mitchell
& Michael E. Hartmann, Collective Bargaining in Milwaukee Public Schools, in CONFLICTING
MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 110 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000)
[hereinafter CONFLICTING MISSIONS].
71. See Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 62, at 20.
72. Moskowitz, supra note 66, at 25.
73. See Leo Casey, Who's Afraid of Teacher Voice? Charter Schools and Union
Organizing, EDwIZE, Nov. 17, 2005, http://edwize.org/whos-afraid-of-teacher-voice-charter-
schools-and-union-organizing (quoting Norman Atkins of Uncommon Schools stating "[Glood
charter schools organize themselves in ways that keep unions out"); Matt Cox, Children vs.
Unions, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2003,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-cox091703.asp ("Despite their rhetoric,
teacher unions place power and money above the welfare of students. They are part of a
reactionary establishment that sees the schools as a giant sinecure rather than something that
exists to benefit children. Battling well-heeled unions every time a charter school opens is no
boon to reformers or the kids they want to help."); see also David W. Kirkpatrick, Viewpoint:
Organizing Charter Schools, a Challenge to Unions, THE BUCKEYE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y
SOLUTIONS, June 5, 2006, http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/article/690.
74. PAUL T. HILL, LYDIA RAINEY & ANDREW J. ROTHERHAM, THE FUTURE OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS AND TEACHER UNIONS: RESULTS OF A SYMPOSIUM 5 (2006), available at
http://www.ncsrp.org/downloads/charter unions.pdf.
75. See Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999)
(upholding the constitutionality of the statute codified at Owio REv. CODE ANN. § 3345.45 (West
2008)).
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interdistrict or intradistrict open enrollment opportunities, the decision to operate a
charter school, the decision to contract out noninstructional support services, the
decision to use volunteers for any services, and decisions to use instructional
technology on a pilot basis. 76 Most of these subjects had been held to be mandatory
subjects of bargaining by the Michigan courts and the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission.77
Contemporary media commentary suggests that the act was a backlash aimed
primarily at the Michigan Education Association (MEA).18 In urging support for the
bill, the Grand Rapids Press editorialized:
[The MEA's] longstanding stranglehold on the bargaining process has given
Michigan teachers a Rolls-Royce health-insurance plan, some of the highest
school salaries in the country and virtual immunity from the state law forbidding
public employee strikes. A consequence is that Michigan school costs from 1980
through '92 rose an average of 8.1 percent a year, with the difference being passed
along to citizens in their property-tax bills.
79
It applauded that under the act "school boards could no longer be bullied into buying
the insurance through the MEA's subsidiary." 80 A stated rationale for restricting the
subjects of bargaining was to prevent ensuing disputes from creating an impasse in
negotiations.
81
This law was one of several actions portrayed as necessary to reduce the power of
the MEA. Republican John Engler defeated incumbent Democrat James Blanchard in
the 1990 gubernatorial election and attained reelection in 1994, in part by demonizing
the MEA. 82 During Engler's tenure, the state abolished property taxes as a source of
school funding, prohibited local districts from raising additional revenue through
millages, and tied state funding to the number of students, while providing for large
numbers of charter schools and allowing students to attend districts other than those of
their residences. 83 In signing the elimination of property tax-based funding, Governor
Engler declared the end of "the power and control the teacher unions have had over
education policies in Michigan . . . ."8 Backlash continued in 1996 as Michigan
76. MICH. CoM-P. LAWS § 423.215(3) (2008).
77. See Andrew Nickelhoff, Marching Headlong into the Past: 1994 PA 112 and the
Erosion of School Employee Bargaining Rights, 74 MICH. B.J. 1186, 1188 (1995).
78. See, e.g., John Foren, Engler-GOP Drive to Cut School Costs Aims at MEA. They Want
to Cut Bargaining Power and Rein in Teacher Strikes, GRAND RAPIDs PRESS, Mar. 19, 1994, at
Al.
79. Editorial, Senate's Turn on School Costs: House-Passed Bill Shifts Controlfrom MEA
to Taxpayers, Boards, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 19, 1994, at A8.
80. Id.
81. See Michael Matheson, Note, Have Michigan Public School Teachers Lost Their
Ability to Strike Under 1994 PA 112?, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 415, 430 (1998).
82. See William Lowe Boyd, David N. Plank & Gary Sykes, Teacher Unions in Hard
Times, in CONFLICTING MissIoNs, supra note 70, at 174, 176-77.
83. See id. at 178-79.
84. Id. at 179.
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revised its school code, increasing the mandatory school year from 180 instructional
days to 190 with no provision for increased teacher compensation.
8 5
Around the same time, legislative backlash against teacher bargaining also arose in
Oregon. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that class size was a mandatory subject of
bargaining. 86 A few years later, the legislature amended the Oregon statute to exclude
from mandatory subjects of bargaining:
[C]lass size, the school or educational calendar, standards of performance or
criteria for evaluation of teachers, the school curriculum, reasonable dress,
grooming and at-work personal conduct requirements respecting smoking, gum
chewing and similar matters of personal conduct, the standards and procedures for
student discipline, the time between student classes, the selection, agendas and
decisions of 21st Century Schools Councils .... 87
In Illinois, where strikes by public employees other than law enforcement personnel
and firefighters are lawful, the 1995 Chicago School Reform Act prohibited strikes
against the Chicago Public Schools and the City Colleges of Chicago for a specified
period of time. 88 The statute also prohibited decision and impact bargaining on the
following subjects: charter school proposals and leaves of absence to work for a
charter school, subcontracting, layoffs and reductions in force, class size, class staffing
and assignment, class schedules, academic calendar, hours and places of instruction,
pupil assessment policies, use and staffing of pilot programs, and use of technology
and staffing to provide technology.89 Contemporary media accounts suggest that the
restrictions on bargaining were aimed at the Chicago Teachers Union. 9° In 2003, after
Democrats were elected to majorities in both houses of the legislature and after a
Democrat was elected governor, the Chicago School Reform Act was amended to
make these subjects permissive subjects of bargaining. 91
Similar school reform legislation in Pennsylvania limited collective bargaining
rights. Under Act 46, enacted in 1998, whenever the Philadelphia school system is
found to be in financial distress, bargaining may not be required over subcontracting,
reductions in force, staffing patterns, assignments, class schedules, school calendar,
85. See id. at 181.
86. Tualatin Valley Bargaining Council v. Tigard Sch. Dist. 23J, 808 P.2d 101 (Or. Ct.
App. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 840 P.2d 657 (Or. 1992).
87. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650(7)(e) (2005). In contrast to Michigan, the Oregon legislative
changes resulted from negotiations between the state's Democrat governor and Republican-
controlled legislature. The original bill restricted the scope of bargaining more severely. For a
fascinating description of the process, see Henry H. Drummonds, A Case Study of the Ex Ante
Veto Negotiations Process: The Derfiler-Bryant Act and the 1995 Amendments to the Oregon
Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law, 32 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 69 (1996).
88. Il. Pub. Act 89-15, § 10 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13(a) (West 2006)
(effective May 30, 1995)).
89. Ill. Pub. Act 89-15, § 10 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 (West 2006)
(effective May 30, 1995)).
90. See, e.g., Doug Finke & Amy E. Williams, GOP Plan for Chicago Schools Takes Aim
at Union, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, May 11, 1995, at 1.
91. Ill. Pub. Act 93-3 § 10 (codified at 115 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 (West 2006)
(effective Apr. 16, 2003)).
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pupil assessment, teacher preparation time, experimental programs, charter schools,
and use of technology.
92
The view that collective bargaining impedes effective government and the
accompanying backlash has not been limited to national security and public education.
For example, in revoking the executive order which had conferred bargaining rights on
Indiana state employees, Governor Mitch Daniels cited provisions in the state
employees' collective bargaining agreement which required thirty days' notice before
reorganizing departments, which he contended would preclude him from transferring
workers to newly created agencies.93 He also maintained that the state paid for
thousands of hours spent on union-related activities instead of public service. 94
III. THE PARADOX IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW DOCTRINE
The view that public sector collective bargaining is antidemocratic is not confined
to those who advocate prohibiting unionization of public employees. Wellington and
Winter, for example, cite their concerns with the antidemocratic nature ofpublic sector
collective bargaining as grounds for prohibiting public employee strikes,95 and for
limiting the scope of issues subject to negotiation.96 Similarly, Clyde Summers, a
staunch supporter of public sector collective bargaining, urges that its antidemocratic
nature drives the determination of which subjects are mandatorily bargainable. 97
These views have not been lost on the courts. Courts have cited the antidemocratic
nature of public sector collective bargaining as a primary justification for limiting the
subjects over which public employers are required to negotiate. The South Dakota
Supreme Court's decision in Aberdeen Education Association v. Aberdeen Board of
Education,9" provides an extreme example. The court expressed concern that collective
negotiations not impinge on the ability of "the whole people [to] speak by means of
laws enacted by their representatives" 99 and held a number of items, including teacher
preparation periods, the scheduling of teacher conferences, and the availability of aides
to perform nonteaching duties such as playground supervision, to be outside the scope
of bargainable subjects. I00
92. See David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the Schoolhouse:
How Legislatures and Courts ShapedLabor Relations for Public Education Employees During
the Last Decade, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 275,295 (2001); see also Boyd et al., supra note 82, at 186-
92 (describing political backlash against teacher unions in Pennsylvania, particularly
Philadelphia).
93. See Clarren, supra note 4.
94. Id.
95. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 14, at 142.
96. See id. at 167.
97. See Clyde Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 441 (2003).
98. 215 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 1974).
99. Id. at841.
100. Id.
1384 [Vol. 84:1369
THE PARADOX OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that school calendar and
employee reclassifications are prohibited subjects of bargaining.'0' The court
explained:
Local [school] boards are state agencies, and, as such, are responsible to other
appropriate state officials and to the public at large. Unlike private sector
employers, local boards must respond to the community's needs. Public school
employees are but one of many groups in the community attempting to shape
educational policy by exerting influence on local boards. To the extent that school
employees can force boards to submit matters of educational policy to an
arbitrator, the employees can distort the democratic process by increasing their
influence at the expense of these other groups. 102
Jurisdictions have adopted a variety of approaches to curbing the antidemocratic
nature of public sector collective bargaining. A few specify in the statute what subjects
must be negotiated. 0 3 Most follow the National Labor Relations Act model and require
bargaining on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, but temper
that mandate with broadly worded management rights clauses.'104 States such as New
Jersey and South Dakota go so far as to prohibit bargaining on subjects not deemed
mandatorily negotiable. 0 5 Their rationale is rooted in the view that public sector
bargaining is antidemocratic. As the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted, "the very
foundation of representative democracy would be endangered if decisions on
significant matters of governmental policy were left to the process of collective
negotiation, where citizen participation is precluded." 1 6
Most jurisdictions follow the private sector model of dividing subjects of bargaining
into mandatory, permissive, and prohibited. The problem that labor boards and courts
have had to confront is how to deal with two potentially extremely broad concepts. At
some level, every decision affects conditions of employment, and, at some level, every
decision affects public policy or managerial authority. Even bargaining about such
basic matters as wages affects the allocation of scarce public resources and thereby
affects the determination of public policy. The Court of Appeals of Maryland aptly
described the situation: "[V]irtually every managerial decision in some way relates to
'salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions,' and is therefore arguably
negotiable. At the same time, virtually every such decision also involves educational
policy considerations and is therefore arguably nonnegotiable."'
10 7
101. Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 534 A.2d 980,988-89 (Md. 1987).
102. Id. at 987 (citation omitted); see also Appeal of City of Concord, 651 A.2d 944, 946
(N.H. 1994) (expressing similar concerns); City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 723 (Wis. 1979) (expressing similar concerns).
103. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(b)(1997).
104. See GRODIN ETAL., supra note 41, at 213-20.
105. See Local 195, IFPTE v. State, 443 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1982); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v.
Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 1974).
106. Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 393 A.2d 278,287 (N.J.
1978); see also Local 195,443 A.2d at 191 ("Matters of public policy are properly decided, not
by negotiation and arbitration, but by the political process.").
107. Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n, 534 A.2d at 986.
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The most common response to this problem has been to balance the interests of
employees in bargaining an issue against the impact of the issue on managerial
prerogatives and public policy. This balancing test has taken various forms.
One form of the balancing test is, in effect, a presumption against collective
bargaining. For example, in Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Association v. City of Corpus
Christi, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that bargaining is required on a subject
"only if it has a greater effect on working conditions than on management
prerogatives."'' 08 The court held that grooming standards for firefighters and changes to
rules governing the evaluation of employees who drove city vehicles were not
mandatorily bargainable.109
Similarly, the California Supreme Court, in holding that the decision to eliminate a
bargaining unit position and reassign its duties was a mandatory subject of bargaining,
opined, "If an action is taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy decision,
it is within the scope of representation only if the employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-
employee relations of bargaining about the action in question."l"0 In Pennsylvania, the
presence of an express management rights provision has been determinative in setting
presumptions. The general Pennsylvania public employee labor relations statute
contains an express management rights provision."' This has led the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to hold that a subject is mandatorily bargainable if "the impact of the
issue on the interest of the employe [sic] in wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment outweighs its probable effect on the basic policy of the system as a
whole."1 2 On the other hand, the Pennsylvania statute governing police and firefighter
collective bargaining does not contain a management rights provision" 3 and
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted it to require bargaining unless "the managerial
policy.., substantially outweigh[s] any impact an issue will have on the performance
of the duties of the police or fire employees."
' 14
Most jurisdictions, however, have not expressly declared a presumption in favor of
or against bargaining. Instead, they have opined that whether an item is a mandatory
subject of bargaining will turn on whether its impact on working conditions or its
impact on public policy predominates. 115 These jurisdictions candidly confess that such
subject-by-subject balancing does not lend itself to predictability or consistency." 6
108. 10 S.W.3d 723, 728 (Tex. App. 1999).
109. Id.
110. Bldg. Material & Constr. Teamsters' Union v. Farrell, 715 P.2d 648,653 (Cal. 1986).
111. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.702 (West 2008).
112. Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 268 (Pa. 1975).
113. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West 2008).
114. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 727 A.2d 1187,
1190 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
115. See, e.g., W. Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526, 531 (Conn. 1972);
Fratemal Order of Police, Miami Lodge No. 20 v. City of Miami, 609 So. 2d 31, 33-34 (Fla.
1992); Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 534 A.2d 980,986 (Md. 1987); City
of Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997);
Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19,621 P.2d 547, 559-60 (Or. 1980); W.
Bend Educ. Ass'n v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 357 N.W.2d 534,538 (Wis. 1984).
116. See, e.g., City of Lynn, 681 N.E.2d at 1237 (stating that "[any attempt to define with
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Typically, the courts leave such determinations to the labor relations board to make
in the first instance.1 17 Nevertheless, the approach of subject-by-subject balancing has
encouraged parties to fight over the negotiability of subjects long settled as
mandatorily bargainable in the private sector. For example, although the Supreme
Court held in 1979 that prices charged in an employee cafeteria are a mandatory
subject of bargaining," 8 almost three decades later, the University of Illinois and
unions representing its employees fought over whether parking fees charged to
employees had to be bargained. " 9
A survey of the results of such ad hoc balancing across jurisdictions makes it clear
that whether a subject primarily affects working conditions or managerial policy is in
the eyes of whoever is reading the scale. Conflicting results have been reached on
numerous subjects including: class size,120 school calendar,' 2' drug testing, 122
precision and certainty the subjects about which bargaining is mandated... is doomed to failure
..."). Not every jurisdiction has adopted this approach. One notable exception is Montana. In
Bonner School District No. 14 v. Bonner Education Ass 'n, the court held that teacher transfers
were a mandatory subject of bargaining even though the Montana Collective Bargaining for
Public Employees Act's management rights provision included as management prerogatives to
"hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees." 176 P.3d 262, 267 (Mont. 2008). The
court reasoned that mandating bargaining did not conflict with the statutory managerial
prerogative because bargaining did not require agreement and the school board retained the
exclusive right to make the final decision on the matter. Id. at 268. Similarly, under the Vermont
State Employees Labor Relations Act, bargaining is required on "[a]ll matters relating to the
relationship between the employer and employees.., except those matters which are prescribed
or controlled by statute." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904 (2003). In Vermont State Colleges Faculty
Federation v. Vermont State Colleges, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the Vermont Labor
Relations Board's analogy to precedent under the NLRA dividing subjects of bargaining into
mandatory and permissive categories. 418 A.2d 34, 37 (Vt. 1980). The court interpreted the
Vermont statute as dividing subjects into those that relate to the relationship between employer
and employee and those that are prescribed or controlled by statute. Id. at 38. The court held that
a union proposal for a system of shared faculty governance was mandatorily bargainable. Id.
117. See, e.g., Central City Educ. Ass'n v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 599 N.E.2d 892,
904 (Ill. 1992).
118. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 494-503 (1979).
119. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 862 N.E.2d 944 (Ill.
2007).
120. Compare W. Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526,536-37 (Conn. 1972),
and Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Sch. Comm., 350 N.E.2d 707, 713-14 (Mass. 1976),
with Hillsborough Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Sch. Bd., 423 So. 2d 969, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-Topeka v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501,592 P.2d 93, 98 (Kan. 1979),
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 403 (Me. 1973), Sch. Dist. of
Seward Educ. Ass'n v. Sch. Dist., 199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (Neb. 1972), Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v.
Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 311 A.2d 737, 741 (N.J. 1973), andW. Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v.
Helsby, 315 N.E.2d 775 (N.Y. 1974).
121. Compare State v. Conn. Bd. of Labor Relations, No. 379709S, 1993 WL 7261, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1993), with Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 534
A.2d 980, 980 (Md. 1987).
122. Compare Holiday v. City of Modesto, 280 Cal. Rptr. 206, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991),
and County of Cook v. Licensed Practical Nurses Ass'n, 671 N.E.2d 787, 792-93 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996), with Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 v. City of Miami, 609 So. 2d 31, 31
(Fla. 1992).
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smoking, 123 and subcontracting. 124 The same observer of the scale has drawn fine lines
between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects. For example, the California Court of
Appeals held that drug testing of a firefighter was a mandatory subject of bargaining,
but suggested that the balance between employer prerogative and employee interests
would be struck differently upon a showing that the order to drug test was motivated
primarily by concerns of public safety. 25 The Florida Supreme Court held that a city
need not negotiate drug testing of police officers where there is reason to suspect drug
involvement, but suggested that a general random drug testing program would require
bargaining. 126
In New York, the employer's motivation also is significant in determining whether a
subject must be bargained. In Levitt v. Board of Collective Bargaining,'27 the City of
New York unilaterally instituted a requirement that all applicants for employment and
for promotion disclose any debts they owed to the city and either pay those debts or
agree to have payments deducted from their wages as a condition of employment or
promotion.128 The court held that the directive was a mandatory subject of bargaining
because its primary motive was to raise revenue.1 29 The court suggested that if the
directive had been concerned with reputation and character as a qualification for
employment or promotion, bargaining would not have been required. 30
Legal hair splitting is also quite evident in Oregon. The Oregon Court of Appeals
has held that firefighter manning is not a mandatory subject of bargaining but the
number of firefighters who will respond to a fire call is mandatorily negotiable.' 3 '
Teachers in Oregon fare no better than firefighters in seeking certainty regarding what
they have a right to negotiate. The Oregon court has distinguished between the length
of the school day, which it views as a nonnegotiable matter of educational policy, and
the number of teacher-student contact hours, which must be negotiated. 132 It also has
distinguished between the school calendar, which need not be negotiated, and vacation
periods and the definition of work year for salary purposes, for which bargaining is
required.133 Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled that the establishment
of a ride-along policy in which college student interns and Explorer scouts accompany
123. Compare Newark Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Public Emp. Relations Bd., 632 N.E.2d
443,444 (N.Y. 1994), with Local 1186 of Council No. 4 v. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 620
A.2d 766 (Conn. 1993).
124. Compare In re Hillsboro-Deering Sch. Dist., 737 A.2d 1098 (N.H. 1999), with
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1593 v. Hillsborough Area Reg'l Transit Auth., 742 So. 2d
380, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), City of Belvidere v. Il. State Labor Relations Bd., 692
N.E.2d 295, 305 (I11. 1998), and In re Local 195,443 A.2d 187, 194 (N.J. 1982).
125. Holiday, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
126. Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20, 609 So. 2d at 35.
127. 589 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1992).
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 314 v. City of Salem, 684 P.2d 605, 608 (Or. Ct. App.
1984).
132. Gresham Grade Teachers Ass'n v. Gresham Grade Sch. Dist. No. 4,630 P.2d 1304 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981).
133. E. County Bargaining Council v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 685 P.2d 452, 453 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984).
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police officers in their squad cars is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, but such
decisions as the shifts on which they ride and procedures for handling emergencies
are.
134
The consequences of such case-by-case, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction application of
the balancing test, particularly when combined with the fine splitting of hairs apparent
in some jurisdictions, has produced a surreal type of legal realist approach to the scope
of bargaining in the public sector. Under this approach, there are no settled rules of
general applicability which guide the parties' conduct. Instead, the law becomes what
the labor board or court declares it to be in any particular case and the precedential
effects of the declaration beyond the particular case are minimal. This approach
encourages litigation over bargaining rights and managerial prerogatives and
discourages cooperative discussion of issues of mutual concern.
The stakes are high over whether a matter is considered a mandatory subject of
bargaining. If a matter is not mandatorily negotiable, the union is cut out completely.
For example, the employer has no obligation to provide the union with information
relevant to a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. 135 Similarly, if a matter is not a
mandatory subject, the employer may bypass the union completely and pick and
choose individual employees from whom to seek input.'
36
Concern that public employee collective bargaining is antidemocratic excludes
unions from negotiation over any issue that a labor board or court deems a matter of
public policy. It channels unions to negotiate only over those issues where the direct
effects on wages and working conditions (i.e. traditional bread and butter issues)
outweigh the effects on public policy. Where unions gain the right to negotiate issues
that significantly affect public policy, they do so by stressing the bread and butter
nature of the issue, even though the union's motivation may be to serve as a voice for
the employees in the making of the policy. For example, a police union gains the right
to negotiate over drug testing by emphasizing drug testing as an issue of employee
discipline. Yet the union may be seeking a voice for police officers in the setting of
policy on drug testing in light of the effects of drug testing on officer morale, the
ability of citizens to exploit the policy to harass innocent officers with fraudulent
complaints, and the need to effectively root out impaired officers whose presence
endangers not only public safety but the safety of fellow officers. 137 Similarly, a
teacher's union gains the right to negotiate class size by portraying it as an issue of
employee workload, even though its motive may be to serve as a vehicle for teacher
voice in the educational policy concerns involved in setting class size.138
Channeling collective bargaining away from subjects that involve issues of policy
and confining it to traditional bread and butter issues relegates unions to negotiating
134. City of W. St. Paul v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 466 N.W.2d 27,28 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
135. See, e.g., Vill. of Franklin Park v. I11. State Labor Relations Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144,
1148 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
136. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723,
728 (Tex. App. 1999).
137. See Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 v. City of Miami, 609 So.2d 31,35 (Fla.
1992) (involving a dispute over the need for bargaining in establishing drug-testing policies for
police officers).
138. See, e.g., W. Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526,536-37 (Conn. 1972).
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provisions in collective bargaining agreements that protect their members against the
risks of the enterprise engendered by decisions made and imposed unilaterally by
management. This is particularly evident in the distinction between decision bargaining
and impact bargaining. Yet, it is the requirement of impact bargaining that led critics of
collective bargaining rights for airport screeners to decry collective bargaining as
inconsistent with the flexibility that TSA needed to protect our national security.1
39
Absolved of any responsibility for the decisions themselves by their exclusion from
having any voice, unions have done a very effective job of insulating their members
from the risks of the decisions. They have done such a good job, that the fruits of their
negotiations may be viewed in some cases as impeding effective government. For
example, in public education, teacher unions negotiated provisions defining reasonable
expectations for their work as protection against arbitrary decisions made by
management. As one urban principal explained, "'[tihe thickness, the scope of this
phone book of a contract is, in my view, an indictment of how administrators ran their
schools in the past. 14° However, unions have done such a successful job of protecting
the workers they represent that they have impeded effective government. Susan Moore
Johnson and Susan Kardos explain:
[I]t seemed sensible not to require teachers to teach subjects for which they had no
preparation or to use time designated for classroom preparation standing on
bathroom duty. It was only fair to guarantee teachers a half-hour of duty-free time
to eat their lunch. It did not seem sensible, though, that teachers' work time could
be prescribed to the minute or that they might be expected to meet with parents
only twice a year. Often contracts, particularly those in large, urban districts,
defined teachers' responsibilities narrowly and minimally, thus making teaching
more like labor and less like a profession.1
41
Concerns that mandating bargaining will be antidemocratic-which leads to the
exclusion of workers, through their unions, from having an institutional voice in the
decision-making process-absolve unions of any responsibility for the decisions
themselves. This frees them to concentrate, in impact bargaining, on insulating the
employees to the maximum extent possible from the risks posed by the decisions, even
to the point of undermining the reasons for the decisions. For example, in response to
the publication of A Nation at Risk, 42 numerous state legislatures crafted reforms. In
California, unions negotiated the implementation of the state's Mentor Teacher
Program in ways that preserved deference to seniority and spread the benefits as
broadly as possible. 143 More generally, unions reacted to legislatively-imposed reforms
by undermining the state policies in impact bargaining.
44
139. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
140. Susan Moore Johnson & Susan M. Kardos, Reform Bargaining and Its Promise for
School Improvement, in CONFLICTING MissIoNs, supra note 70, at 7, 12.
141. Id. at 13.
142. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
143. See Johnson & Kardos, supra note 140, at 23.
144. Id. at 24.
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Consider, more recently, Racine Education Association v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission,14 5 where the court upheld a decision by the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission that the Racine Unified School District's decision
to implement a pilot program with a year-round school calendar was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining.146 The conclusion that the decision to move to a year-round
calendar was a matter of educational policy had the result of cutting out the
representative of the school district's teachers from participation in the decision
concerning what would best improve the delivery of educational services. Rather than
being invited to invest in the risks of the school district's enterprises by giving the
union a seat at the table in discussions over scheduling, the union was presented with a
fait accompli. Although I do not know what specifically occurred in Racine's impact
bargaining, it would not be surprising in such a situation to find the union insisting on
strict adherence to the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement,
which could result in an overrepresentation or underrepresentation of less experienced
teachers on the year-round schedule. Similarly, it would not be surprising to see the
union insisting in negotiations on additional compensation for teachers moving to a
year-round schedule or for expanded teacher personal days or other benefits that could
be used to not only lessen the burden on the teachers of the schedule change, but also
to impede the effectiveness of the schedule change for the students. It is also not
surprising, given the case-by-case ad hoc balancing used to determine whether a matter
is mandatorily negotiable, that the union litigated the legality of the school district's
unilateral move to a year-round schedule. Such litigation could only cloud the program
with uncertainty until the litigation was concluded.
IV. A WAY OUT OF THE PARADOX
The paradox of public sector labor law is that to avoid antidemocratic aspects of
public sector collective bargaining, the law has channeled public employee unions
away from investing in the risks of the public enterprise and toward insulating their
members from those risks. Unions have done such an effective job in their channeled
role that their collective bargaining agreements can impede effective government.
There is good reason to believe that giving employees, through their unions, an
institutional voice in the initial decision making will increase the likelihood that they
will become agents of, instead of obstructions to, effective change. Studies in the
private sector show that when unions are strong and have a cooperative relationship
with management, they provide independent employee voice that plays a crucial role in
the successful development and sustenance of high performance workplace
practices. 147 These findings are consistent with the general social-psychology
procedural justice literature which finds positive outcomes associated generally with
145. 571 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
146. Id. at 887.
147. See Carol Gill, Union Impact on the Effective Adoption of High Performance Work
Practices, 19 HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. REv. 39 (2009); see also William N. Cooke, Product
Quality Improvement Through Employee Participation: The Effects of Union-Management
Administration, 46 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 119 (1992) (finding positive collective employee
voice and product quality improvement when unions are treated as partners and union leaders
are involved in administering participation programs).
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employee voice, that is, having an opportunity to be heard concerning decisions that
affect them, even when the outcomes are not what the employees desired.
148
Experiences in the public sector suggest similar positive results from an
institutionalized employee collective voice in the decision-making process. Consider
the complaint that unions impede reform in public education by clinging to the salary
grid, which bases teachers' pay exclusively on education level and years of service.
49
When movement away from the salary grid is imposed unilaterally, union resistance is
almost reflexive. For example, when the New York public schools announced a pilot
program to estimate the value added to student test performance by teachers in 140
schools, union president Randi Weingarten responded that the union would "fight this
on all grounds--educational, legal and moral."'
50
Contrast the reaction in New York to the union's engagement in Denver, Colorado.
In 2004, the membership of the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA)
voted to approve a union-school district incentive pay plan known as the Professional
Compensation System for Teachers (Pro Comp).' 15 A design team consisting of five
teachers, five administrators, and two citizens devised the plan.'52 In November 2005,
voters approved a tax increase to fund the plan.153 New hires are automatically enrolled
in the plan, while existing teachers have the option of enrolling.5 4 Although the DCTA
cautioned many existing teachers about opting into Pro Comp, 55 twenty-eight percent
opted in during the program's first year. 5 6 Under the plan, teachers receive
compensation based on "professional development units" representing specific
knowledge and skills they acquire (as opposed to any college-education school credits)
according to the results of their professional evaluations, as an incentive to teach in
hard-to-staff schools and in hard-to-find specialties, and according to student
achievement. 57 A council composed of teachers, administrators, and community
members run the professional evaluation program.15
8
148. See, e.g., Brian D. Cawley, Lisa M. Keeping & Paul E. Levy, Participation in the
Performance Appraisal Process and Employee Reactions: A Meta-Analytic Review of Field
Investigations, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 615 (1998).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
150. See Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham, Collective Bargaining in Education and
Pay for Performance 11 (Nat'l Ctr. on Performance Incentives, Working Paper 2008-11,2008)
available at
www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/directory/ConferencePapersNews/Hannaway-et-a
1-2008.pdf.
151. Denver Public Schools, Professional Compensation for Teachers, Overview, available
at http://denverprocomp.dpskl 2.org/stories/storyReader$27.
152. Id.
153. See Bess Keller, Denver Voters Pave Way for Incentive Pay, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 9,
2005, at 3, 18.
154. Id.
155. See DENVER CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT PROCOMP 3
(2006), available at
http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/opge/disc/gov-edexcellence/StraightTalk-ProComp.pdf(cautioning
teachers between steps 5 and 13 on the traditional salary schedule against opting in).
156. Hannaway & Rotherham, supra note 150, at 18.
157. See Keller supra note 153.
158. AGREEMENT BETWEEN SCHOOL DIsTRIcT No. I IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENvER,
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Pro Comp's biggest labor-management challenge occurred in the spring and
summer of 2008. The union sought an across-the-board percentage pay raise, while the
district sought to shift incentives to increase compensation for junior teachers, with
increases to base pay, other than cost of living increases, stopping after thirteen years
of service.159 Performance-based bonuses for senior teachers would continue but would
not be folded into base salary.160 The controversy led to a union vote of no confidence
in the superintendent and a sick-out in May 2008.161 Opposition to the district's
proposal was not unanimous within the union, however, as a significant number of
teachers signed a petition affirming principles that tended to support the district's
proposals. 162 Ultimately, an agreement was reached which increased available
incentives, boosted starting teacher pay to the level the district had sought, and capped
increases in base pay except for cost-of-living increases for teachers after fourteen
years of service.
63
Public sector collective bargaining is said to impede effective government by
making it difficult, if not impossible, to terminate ineffective employees. Where
management controls the evaluation and discipline of employees, the union is
channeled into a role of protecting its members from management-imposed discipline.
It protects its members collectively by negotiating controls over the implementation of
management's unilaterally promulgated performance standards. These controls often
include specifying the number of times a principal may observe a teacher, requiring
advance notice of observations, and similar protections for teachers under review. It
protects its members individually by challenging management to justify disciplinary
measures in an adversarial proceeding, such as an arbitration or statutory tenure or civil
service proceeding.
When the union serves as a vehicle for collective employee voice in the evaluation
and discipline of employees, the union can be transformed from an impediment to
effective government into a contributor. Such has been the case with teacher peer
review. One of the earliest and most notable examples of teacher peer review was in
the Toledo, Ohio Public Schools. 164 The Toledo system employs an Internal Board of
Review (IBR), consisting of five union and four district representatives. New teachers
participate in a two-year intern program with an IBR consulting teacher. The IBR also
oversees a plan for tenured teachers whose substandard performance led to a joint
referral by the teacher's principal and union building representative. Evidence suggests
STATE OF COLORADO AND DENVER CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION: PROFESSIONAL
COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR TEACHERs 5 (2006), available at
http://www.dpskl2.org/manila/programs/denverprocomp/ProCompAgreementrevl2008.pdf
159. See Kathleen Kingsbury, A Merit-Pay Standoff in Denver, TIME, Aug. 19, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1833989,00.html.
160. See id.; Jeremy P. Meyer, Merit Pay Splits DPS, Union, DENVER POST, Aug. 11, 2008,
at Al; Stephanie Simon, Denver Teachers Object to Changes in Pay-for-Performance Plan,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at A3.
161. See Kingsbury, supra note 159.
162. See Denver Teachers for Change.org, Sign Our Petition,
http://denverteachersforchange.org//?page=Sign-Our-Petition.
163. See Editorial, DPS Deal Would Be Goodfor District and Teachers, DENVER POST, Aug.
26, 2008, at A18.
164. This discussion of peer review is drawn from my earlier article, Martin H. Malin &
Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or
Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 885, 904-07 (2007).
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that more probationary teachers and tenured teachers with performance problems leave
the system than under a system of review and discipline unilaterally controlled by
management. A similar system in the Cincinnati, Ohio Public Schools was examined
by the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Excellence in State and Local Government
Through Labor-Management Cooperation and found to have led to a greater
percentage of probationary teachers and teachers in remediation leaving the system
when reviewed by peers than when reviewed solely by administrators.1
65
Peer review has been successful in large part because of teacher involvement
through their unions in developing the evaluation standards. Teachers are forced to
reflect on what constitutes good teaching and express those standards in terms that are
accessible and acceptable to their peers. Having actively participated in developing the
standards, the union is more likely to view its role as protecting the standards of
teaching instead of protecting individual teachers from evaluations unilaterally
imposed from above. Peer reviewers spend considerably greater time than
administrators with the teachers under review, and when reviews are negative, they
generally produce a record that is very compelling. Although the teachers remain
contractually or statutorily entitled to union representation to challenge negative
results, the thoroughness of the peer review record makes it unlikely that such
challenges will succeed.166
Contracting out is often put forth as a panacea for remedying public employee
collective bargaining's impediments to effective government. Some jurisdictions
further this alternative by holding that the decision to subcontract is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. 167 However, although the decision may not be mandatorily
negotiable, the employer generally remains obligated to bargain the impact of the
decision on the employees. In such impact bargaining, the union may seek to raise the
transaction costs of contracting to such a level as will induce the employer to abandon
the option.
An alternative to public employers avoiding collectively represented employees by
contracting their jobs to the private sector is to empower those workers to compete
against private contractors for the work. One example of such empowerment,
highlighted by the Secretary of Labor's Task Force, occurred in the Massachusetts
Highway Department. When the state decided to subcontract highway maintenance, the
unions who represented the employees who had been performing those duties formed a
coalition and bid against the contractors. 68 They were awarded the job and assumed
responsibility for organizing and managing it.169 The resulting improvements included
a sixty percent reduction in workers' compensation claims, a seventy percent reduction
in overtime and a 49.5% reduction in sick time.170 Improved efficiency saved the state
165. U.S. SEC'Y OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T
THROUGH LABOR-MGMT. COOPERATION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: FINAL
REPORT 117-18 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. SEC'Y OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE].
166. See Charles Taylor Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich, Organizing Around Quality: The
Frontiers of Teacher Unionism, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS, supra note 70, at 281, 290-93.
167. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1593 v. Hillsborough Area Reg'l Transit
Auth., 742 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
168. U.S. SEC'Y OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 165, at 27.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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more than $7.8 million. 1 ' Road sweeping and cleaning of gutters became more
regular. 172 Worker suggestions for improved maintenance of equipment enabled the
purchase and lease of new equipment.' 73 As with teacher peer review, the role of the
union changed dramatically. The Secretary of Labor's Task Force quoted one union
official involved, "My job used to be to go around and ask people what grievances they
had. My job is now to go around asking people what ideas they have to improve this
job.", 174
Perhaps the largest effort to benefit from expanded employee voice in the public
sector occurred with the Clinton Administration's establishment of labor-management
partnerships. In the final days of the Clinton Administration, the Office of Personnel
Management issued a report, which, among other things, catalogued the successes
produced by labor-management partnerships.175 Specific examples listed in the report
included:
" Partnering between the Internal Revenue Service and the National Treasury
Employees Union to modernize and restructure the IRS, resulting in
measurable improvements in customer service and job satisfaction.
* A partnership between American Federation of Government Employees Local
3973 and Defense Contract Management Command's Raytheon Missile
Systems facility resulted in an overwhelming improvement in customer service
ratings as workload increased 100% and the workforce downsized, with
$900,000 saved from the reduction in labor-management litigation.
* The U.S. Mint and the AFGE Mint Council engaged in joint strategic planning,
resulting in the U.S. Mint's consistent ranking near the top of the American
Customer Satisfaction Index and its production of record numbers of coins and
return of record profits to taxpayers.
* The Social Security Administration (SSA) and the AFGE partnership
reengineered practices related to SSA's toll free number, resulting in SSA
outscoring all other organizations for 800 number customer satisfaction in
1995 and in a 1999 customer satisfaction rating of eighty-eight percent.
* Partnerships between the James A. Haley Veterans' Hospital and the AFGE
Local 547, the Florida Nurses Association, and the Tampa Professional Nurses
Unit reduced delivery time for critical medication from ninety-two minutes to
twenty minutes, cut turnaround time for x-ray reports from eight days to one
day, and reduced processing time for pension and compensation exams from
thirty-one days to eighteen days.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 27-28.
174. Id. at 84. For a discussion of a similar initiative in Indianapolis, see Stephen Goldsmith
& Mark E. Schneider, Partnering for Public Value: New Approaches in Public Employee
Labor-Management Relations, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 415 (2003).
175. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERsIP: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (2000), available at http://www.opm.govlmr/report/. Specifically, Section III,
Results and Accomplishments, discusses many of these examples. Id.
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" A National Treasury Employees Union and Customs Service partnership
designed a seven-step strategy to increase seizures of illegal drugs. During the
six-month life of the joint action plan, narcotics seizures increased by forty-two
percent and drug currency seizures increased by seventy-four percent.
* A partnership between the Defense Distribution Depot in San Joaquin and
AFGE Local 1546 saved $950,000 per year by reducing workplace accidents
by twenty percent and ergonomic injuries by forty percent, reduced overtime
expenses from $9.8 million to $1.4 million, and reduced production costs from
$25.42 per unit to $23.48 per unit.
Charles Kerchner and I have catalogued additional examples of teacher unions
investing in and sharing the risks of the public school enterprise. 176 The Secretary of
Labor's Task Force catalogued numerous others in the public sector generally.' 177 These
examples demonstrate that when employees, acting through their exclusive bargaining
representative, have a voice in decisions that affect the risks of the enterprise, they tend
to share in the risks and to be transformed into agents of positive change.' 78 These
examples share another characteristic. They all occurred in spite of the law rather than
because of the law.
Although it has become a clich6 to speak of the states as laboratories for
experimentation in different areas of legal regulation, the clichi applies with
considerable force to collective representation of public employees. 179 The states, and
the federal government with respect to its own employees, have experimented with a
diversity of approaches to such matters including collective bargaining rights for
supervisors,18 0 the regulation of strikes,' 8 and the development of alternative
approaches to resolving bargaining impasses.18 2 More recently, some public sector
jurisdictions have experimented with mandating card check recognition. 183
Public sector jurisdictions in these areas and others have shown a willingness to
break away from strict adherence to the NLRA model. A similar break with the NLRA
model, whereby a subject is either mandatorily bargainable or subject to complete
unilateral control by management, may produce fruitful reform. This reform may be
able to solve the paradox that currently exists in public sector labor relations whereby
concerns with the antidemocratic tendencies ofpublic employee collective bargaining
lead to a narrowing of the scope of bargaining which channels employees and their
176. Malin & Kerchner, supra note 164, at 903-11.
177. U.S. SEC'Y OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 165.
178. This does not mean that employees do or should take on all risks. Protection against
some of the risks of the enterprise can play an essential role in transforming employees into
agents of positive change. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Schneider, supra note 174, at 422.
179. See generally Hodges, supra note 31 (comparing two very different state approaches to
public employee collective bargaining, Illinois and Virginia, and discerning "lessons from the
laboratory").
180. See GRODIN ETAL., supra note 41, at 140-52.
181. See id at 277-325.
182. See id at 326-70.
183. See Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileging "Employer Free Choice" Over
Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REv. 329, 344-51 (2008).
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unions into becoming vehicles that impede effective government rather than facilitating
it.
There are numerous approaches that jurisdictions might consider for enhancing
collective employee voice in an institutionalized way. Jurisdictions might experiment
with broadening the scope of traditional bargaining. Montana may be headed in this
direction. In Bonner School District No. 14 v. Bonner Education Association, the
Montana Supreme Court held that teacher transfers were a mandatory bargaining
subject, even though the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act
expressly included transferring employees as a management prerogative.'84 The court
reasoned that mandating bargaining did not conflict with the statutory managerial
prerogative because bargaining did not require agreement and the school board
retained the exclusive right to make the final decision on the matter.'8 5 The court could
reach that conclusion because under the Montana statute, a union can compel an
employer to participate in nonbinding fact finding,' 86 but interest arbitration may occur
only by agreement.' 87 Thus, the employer in Montana does retain the exclusive right to
make the final decision even if the matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The evolving law in Montana suggests a second approach to employee voice in
decisions affecting the risks of the enterprise for jurisdictions to consider. They might
make such decisions mandatory subjects of bargaining for purposes of negotiations but
permissive subjects for purposes of strikes, in right to strike jurisdictions,' 88 and
interest arbitration in jurisdictions that mandate arbitration as their impasse resolution
procedure. Thus, a union would not have a right to strike over the subject and would
not be able to compel arbitration over it. Yet, because the decision would be a
mandatory subject for purposes of negotiation, the employer would be precluded from
bypassing the exclusive representative and would be under a duty to supply relevant
information to that representative.
Alternative models for consideration exist. These include the labor-management
partnerships established under the Clinton Administration. The structure of those
partnerships evolved during President Clinton's two terms in office. Initially, they
consisted of representatives of the employer and the union, but they evolved to include
representatives of middle-level managers.
Another model has emerged for some employees in Minnesota. Minnesota requires
that employers meet and confer with representatives of their professional employees to
discuss policies and other matters relating to employment that are not mandatory
subjects of bargaining.' 8 9 It requires that the meet-and-confer sessions take place at
184. 176 P.3d 262 (Mont. 2008).
185. Id. at 268.
186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-309(3) (2007).
187. Id. § 39-31-310.
188. I recognize that in Montana, most public employees have a right to strike. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-31-401 (2007) (prohibiting strikes by police officers); id. § 39-34-105
(prohibiting strikes by firefighters); id. § 39-32-110 (restricting strikes by health care
employees); State v. Public Employee Craft Council, 529 P.2d 78 (Mont. 1974) (interpreting
Montana public employee collective bargaining statute's right to engage in concerted activities
for mutual aid and protection as including a right to strike).
189. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.07(3) (West 2006).
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least once every four months. 190 It also prohibits the employer from meeting and
conferring with any employee or group of employees in a bargaining unit, except
through their exclusive bargaining representative.191 The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of this latter provision.192 Such meet-and-confer sessions can provide
employees with a voice in decisions that are not mandatorily negotiable.
The experiences of employers such as the City of Indianapolis and the
Massachusetts Highway Department suggest that jurisdictions consider requiring
public employers to afford unions the opportunity to bid and provide them with the
information necessary to make informed bids, before contracting out bargaining unit
work. In public education, some have suggested that teacher unions and school districts
be required to negotiate student performance and accountability for the results. 193 The
above list is only a beginning.
A common characteristic of all of the above models is that they mandate collective
employee voice without mandating all of the elements of formal collective bargaining.
In particular, they do not subject the collective discussions to a final impasse
procedure, whether it be a right to strike or a right to interest arbitration. When a union
negotiates a mandatory subject of bargaining with a right to compel interest arbitration
in the event of a bargaining impasse, the union has the ability to shut out other interest
groups from the process that will make the decision with finality. When the union has
the right to strike, some, such as Wellington and Winter, have argued that it possesses a
weapon that is so powerful that it will effectively shut out other interest groups from
the process.' 94 Elsewhere, I have disputed this latter point. 95 I will not repeat the
challenge here. The debate over the right to strike in public employment is irrelevant to
the proposal advanced here, where no right to strike would attach. The key point is that
mandating formal collective employee voice in the decision-making process does not
exclude other interest groups from that process. Consequently, the concerns for
democratic processes that have led to courts narrowing the scope of formal bargaining
need not inhibit experimentation with alternative vehicles for collective employee
voice.
Of course, as such examples as the Denver experiment with merit pay, teacher peer
review in Toledo, and the Massachusetts Highway Authority illustrate, when people on
both sides want to work together for their mutual benefit they will do so in spite of the
law and will succeed. On the other hand, no matter what the legal structure, there will
be parties who will seek to subvert its purposes. When the law is structured in a manner
more favorable to collective employee voice in employer decision making, there will
be managers who will not really provide voice to the union and there will be unions
who will use the structure strategically to obstruct the government entity's mission.
Most people, however, allow themselves to be channeled along the lines that the law
channels them and thus, for most relationships, the legal structure will make a
difference. Once jurisdictions break with the NLRA bipolar model that provides that
190. Id. § 179A.08(2).
191. Id. § 179A.07(4).
192. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
193. See, e.g., Kaboolian, supra note 69, at 16.
194. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 14, at 25.
195. See Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 319-25 (1993).
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every matter is either mandatorily negotiable or left to unilateral management control,
they can experiment with vehicles of enhanced employee voice which may solve the
paradox in public sector labor law by preserving democratic processes while
transforming the roles of exclusive bargaining representatives.

